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abstract
This article explores the accountability of international financial institutions (IFIs),
such as the World Bank, for human rights violations related to the massive leakage
of funds from sub-Saharan Africa’s health sector. The article begins by summarizing
the quantitative results of Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys performed in six
African countries, all showing disturbingly high levels of leakage in the health sector.
It then addresses the inadequacy of good governance and anticorruption programs in
remedying this problem. After explaining how the World Bank’s Inspection Panel
may serve as an accountability mechanism for addressing the leakage of funds, discussing violations of specific Bank policies and procedures that would support a claim
related to leakage and examining the relevance of human rights concerns to such as
claim, the article explores some of the Panel’s limitations and the positive steps taken
to address these concerns.
introduction
This article explores the accountability of international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank, for human rights violations as they
relate to the massive leakage of funds from sub-Saharan Africa’s health
sector. The actual extent of such leakage has slowly surfaced over the
past decade through the use of Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
(PETS) that trace the funds allocated to a specific sector from the central
government to frontline providers. While the quantitative results of such
surveys are rarely discussed outside the donor community, they reveal
that, in many cases, the vast majority of funds never reach clinics and hospitals that actually provide health services. While leakage is not equivalent
to corruption, it certainly signals a need for monitoring, evaluation, and
investigation. Large levels of leakage also indicate that civil society is not
able to participate effectively in demanding the resources to which they
are entitled.
In addressing this topic, the article focuses on four related aspects of
leakage and its implications for health and human rights. First, it summarizes the quantitative results of public expenditure tracking surveys
performed in six African countries, all of them showing disturbingly
high levels of leakage in the health sector. Second, it addresses the inadequacy of good governance and anticorruption programs in remedying
this problem. Third, it explains how the World Bank’s Inspection Panel
may serve as an accountability mechanism for addressing the leakage of
funds, discussing violations of specific World Bank policies and procedures that would support a claim related to leakage and examining the
relevance of human rights concerns to such a claim. Finally, the article
explores some of the Panel’s limitations and the positive steps taken to
address these concerns.
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While arguments regarding the Bank’s direct or
indirect accountability under international human
rights law are important, this paper takes a different approach, focusing on how to utilize the Bank’s
internal accountability mechanism — the Inspection
Panel — as a way to highlight the human rights issues
related to leakage and push forward interpretations of
the Bank’s internal policies that conform to international human rights law. The main advantage of this
approach is that it circumvents many of the legal hurdles involved in attempting to establish direct or indirect accountability. Another benefit of this approach
is its potential application to other IFIs, which have
very similar internal accountability mechanisms modeled after the World Bank’s Inspection Panel.1
the massive leakage of funds from
africa’s health sector
Historically, lack of information about public spending in key social sectors, such as health and education,
has made it difficult to hold governments accountable.2 Poor reporting, highly aggregated data, and
discretionary allocations all contribute to the problem, creating nontransparent processes that camouflage how allocated funds are actually being used.3
Traditional methods for assessing outcomes in service delivery include household surveys and social
impact assessments, which generally provide qualitative information. More recently, donors, such as the
World Bank, have developed the Public Expenditure
Tracking Survey (PETS) as a diagnostic and monitoring tool to understand problems in budget execution.4
PETS tracks the flow of resources through various
levels of government to the frontline providers (for
example, health care clinics and schools) by collecting data at each level and comparing sources, thereby
determining where resources are being absorbed and
where they are going astray.5 During the past decade,
the proliferation of PETS throughout Africa has
exposed massive leakage of funds in the health and
education sectors. These results, however, have surprisingly received little publicity.
“Leakage” is generally defined as the share of
resources intended for, but not received by, frontline providers.6 While “leakage” is not equivalent to
corruption, it is often “a good indicator of corruption.”7 Consequently, evidence of substantial leakage
in a given sector should invite further investigation
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into possible corruption. The results of PETS conducted in Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia, Chad,
and Kenya all provide firm estimates of leakage in
the health sectors. Key findings from these PETS are
summarized below:
Uganda’s 2000 PETS indicated a leakage rate of 70%
for drugs and supplies, with the most high-demand drugs
(such as those used to treat malaria) being the least
available, while the 1999 PETS indicated that nearly
90% of patients made “informal payments” to providers. PETS performed in 2003–2004 indicated that
absenteeism rates among health staff were greater
than 35% and that 109 staff out of a total of 465
appeared to be “ghosts.”8
Tanzania’s 1999 PETS found that 41% of non-wage
expenditures in health care never reached frontline providers.
A follow-up survey in 2001 revealed that decentralized funds sent to the districts were all consumed at
the district level and that there was no cash funding below
the sector/district level (i.e. only in-kind material reached
the health care facilities).9
Ghana’s 2000 PETS found that 80% of non-wage health
expenditures never reached frontline providers in 1998–1999
and that the majority of resources reaching the district level health offices were in-kind materials, not
cash.10 Consequently, clinics depended mainly on
internally generated funds (i.e. user fees and payments for drugs) for all non-salary recurrent expenditures. Indeed, the study found that 40% of clinics
did not receive any cash assistance from the government and
depended solely on internally generated funds for non-salary
recurrent expenditures.11
Chad’s 2004 joint PETS-QSDS found that 73% of
allocated non-wage recurrent expenditures never reached the
regional health delegations, and over 99% of the non-wage
recurrent expenditures allocated to regions never reached local
health centers.12 Based on the results of PETS, the study
team estimated that, if all public resources officially
budgeted for regional delegations had reached the
frontline providers in 2003, the number of patients
seeking primary health care in Chad would have more
than doubled during the year.13
Kenya’s 2004 PETS found that 38% of the total funds
allocated to the health centers never reached their destination,
25% of user fees “leaked’ from the facility level, and
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37% of the community development funds “leaked”
at the facility level.14 PETS also found that provinces
and districts were unaware of budgets and programs,
the supervisory capacity of provincial and district
authorities were insufficient, and Kenya’s financial
and accounting systems were inadequate.
Lastly, a 2007 study, which examined leakage and
delays of salaries in Zambia’s health sector during
2005–2006, found that 15% of health workers did not
receive all the salaries due to them during the past 12 months,
78% of health sector employees experienced delays in receiving
their salaries, 16% received less than their full salary, and
10% of health sector employees had to pay an “expediter’s fee” to obtain their salary.15
PETS performed in Rwanda (2000 and 2004),
Mozambique (2002), Nigeria (2002), Senegal (2002),
Cameroon (2003), and Namibia (2003) likewise indicated significant leakage of funds, although they
did not provide quantitative results.16 While PETS
have clearly provided a powerful tool that identifies
problems in public expenditure management, revealing massive leakage of funds, the World Bank has
surprisingly found that “the costs and time demands
involved” make the method “impractical for universal application.”17
The high rates of leakage in Africa’s health sectors,
particularly with respect to non-wage expenditures
like medical supplies, have devastating consequences
for the delivery of health services.18 While there are
many complex reasons why Africa’s health sector
remains poor despite significant increases in donor
aid, leakage of funds is one important reason that
should not be ignored.19 The World Bank’s failure to
monitor the use of funds and its refusal to address
directly large-scale leakage render it at least partially
responsible for these factors’ negative impact on
access to health care.
A recent review of the World Bank’s health work,
conducted by the Independent Evaluation Group
(IEG), an in-house unit, found that monitoring of
health programs “remains weak” and “evaluation is
almost nonexistent,” leading to various problems,
including “an inability to measure the effectiveness
of interventions.”20 Performance in Africa was “particularly weak,” with 73% of projects categorized as
unsatisfactory. Moreover, instead of improving over

time, IEG states that “outcome ratings in Africa in
recent years have shown steady declines.”21 According
to a March 2009 review of the health sector strategy
approved by the Bank in 2007, only 25% of projects
in sub-Saharan Africa had satisfactory outcomes.22
These evaluations confirm that the Bank is failing
to take its monitoring obligations seriously, despite
the alarming results of PETS. If African countries
are to make any real progress towards meeting their
Millennium Development Goals, serious efforts
must be made to hold accountable not only borrowing governments, but also the donors.
the inadequacy of good governance and
anticorruption programs
Ever since former World Bank President James
Wolfensohn spoke out against corruption in 1996,
the Bank has paved the road for donors to take
various measures to try to ensure that aid reaches
the intended beneficiaries. These measures include
governance and anticorruption initiatives, as well
as establishing internal accountability mechanisms.
While such efforts represent important strides forward, the IEG’s recent evaluations confirm that the
public sector reforms are insufficient for addressing
accountability concerns, especially the large-scale
leakage described above. In addition, the public sector reforms are all one-sided, focusing exclusively on
recipient governments and ignoring the World Bank’s
joint responsibility for ensuring that aid money actually benefits the poor. The discussion below focuses
specifically on the World Bank’s efforts, since the
Bank considers itself a leader among donors who
support anticorruption efforts.
The World Bank’s main public sector reforms (PSR)
target public financial management, civil service, tax
administration, and corruption. While such reforms
have their roots in the 1980s, they expanded considerably during the 1990s.23 The reforms related
to public expenditure management include, for
example, restructuring budgets, implementing strong
central controls, computerizing financial information
systems, and charging user fees for certain services.24
The Bank’s anticorruption efforts focus primarily on
these indirect methods rather than tackling corruption
head-on.25 Where the Bank has supported direct anticorruption efforts, these primarily target bureaucratic
(i.e. petty) corruption, such as bribe taking, skimming
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paychecks, and nepotism in appointments.26 The
Bank’s petty corruption initiatives include creating
an anticorruption commission with a low-level mandate, requiring public officials to disclose their assets,
investigating and prosecuting officials who have
unaccounted wealth or take bribes, and establishing
a code of conduct for public officials.27
These reforms, unfortunately, have not yielded significant results, although their outcomes are “inherently difficult to measure.”28 In terms of both the
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)
ratings and corruption rankings, low-income countries that receive aid for PSR (such as those in subSaharan Africa) have performed little or no better
than those that did not receive any PSR funding.29 In
other words, the aid provided for PSR reforms had
no noticeable impact in the poorest countries. The
IEG’s 2008 review of the World Bank’s public sector
reforms specifically notes that “[i]mplementation of
the budget — procurement and financial management — has still received too little attention” and
that “civil service reform has been relatively unsuccessful.”30 Commentators have also asserted that the
Bank’s focus on public expenditure management and
policy-making capacity remains very technical, and
therefore, does not include human rights commitments as a key part of national ownership.31
Making matters worse, the IEG found that most
of the Bank’s direct anticorruption initiatives were
“rarely invoked except to settle political scores.”32
Only in “rare cases” has the Bank addressed statecapture (i.e. grand corruption), such as embezzlement
of public funds.33 The isolated cases where the Bank
has addressed state-capture involved “deep political
and economic crises” that “exposed the corruption
of old regimes and brought in new ones dedicated
to a fresh start, such as in Indonesia in the late 1990s
and Nigeria after 2003.”34 In failing to address statecapture directly, the Bank essentially turns a blind
eye to the massive levels of leakage discussed above,
which cannot be due to petty corruption alone.
The IEG’s 2009 review of the Bank’s internal controls further underscores the inadequacy of PSR and
anticorruption efforts. This assessment was “the
first of its kind, not only for the Bank but also for
all international financial organizations.”35 The IEG
found that the Bank’s main weaknesses pertain to
fiduciary controls, resulting in serious risks of fraud
and corruption, especially when combined with sig98 • health and human rights

nificant deficiencies in the areas of risk management,
project financial management, and procurement.36
Given that public sector reforms have proven largely
unsuccessful and that the Bank is unwilling to tackle
state-capture head-on, the current measures for
ensuring that aid reaches the intended recipients are
clearly inadequate. In what follows below, I advocate
using the World Bank’s Inspection Panel as one way
to compel the Bank to take the issue of leakage more
seriously, raising not only violations of the Bank’s
own internal policies, but also violations of closely
related human rights norms.
using internal accountability
mechanisms to hold ifis accountable
for funds leakage
Since the World Bank is failing to take adequate measures to address the leakage of funds, how might the
Bank be held accountable for its acts or omissions?
While some international human rights treaties, as
well as highly influential declarations, guidelines, and
comments, do stress the importance of international
cooperation in protecting human rights, holding the
Bank directly accountable for human rights violations remains a challenge, since international human
rights treaties do not impose obligations on intergovernmental organizations.37 Moreover, although
the Bank, unlike the International Monetary Fund,
enjoys only limited immunity, the immunity clause in
the Bank’s Articles of Agreement presents another
potential hurdle to direct accountability.38
Despite presenting legal hurdles of its own, arguing that the Bank should be held indirectly accountable is one way to circumvent these challenges.39
In 2001, the International Law Commission (ILC)
adopted Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). Over the
next several years, it developed Draft Articles on
the Responsibility of International Organizations
(DARIO). The ILC’s comments indicate that the
ARSIWA and the DARIO must both be taken “fully
into account” in analyzing the attribution of conduct,
but gaps and tensions between the two documents
remain, which are slowly being developed and clarified
through case law.40 Recent decisions by the European
Court for Human Rights and the UK House of
Lords have interpreted the DARIO only in military
context, finding that the acts of a Member State may
be attributed to an international organization only if
it exercises “effective control” over State organs.41
Courts have yet to address whether the “effective
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control” doctrine might apply to the actions of an
international financial institution, although the ILC
has noted that, in many non-military situations, the
conduct may have to be attributed to both the State
and the international organization.42

Using the Inspection Panel to bring claims based on
leakage of funds
Rather than focusing on the Bank’s direct or indirect
accountability under international human rights law,
areas where the legal doctrine is still being developed,
this paper focuses on the Bank’s internal accountability mechanism, the Inspection Panel. The Inspection
Panel can be an effective means, I suggest, for practitioners to highlight the human rights issues related to
leakage and to advance interpretations of the Bank’s
internal policies that conform to international human
rights law. As an established, noncontroversial forum
for claims against the Bank, the Inspection Panel may
serve as a useful, albeit imperfect, proxy to challenge
the human rights violations associated with the massive leakage of funds from Africa’s health sector.
This approach is also applicable to other IFIs, which
have very similar internal accountability mechanisms
modeled after the World Bank’s Inspection Panel.
The process for accessing the Inspection Panel is relatively simple. Two or more individuals (or an organization) may submit a written request for inspection to the Panel if they believe that their “rights or
interests have been or are likely to be directly affected
by an action or omission of the Bank as a result of
a failure of the Bank to follow its own operational
policies and procedures.”43 The Panel, composed of
three members who are randomly selected from a list
of experts, submits the request to Bank Management
for a response. After reviewing both the request and
Management’s response, the Panel makes a recommendation to the Bank’s Board about whether the
allegations merit an investigation. If the Board agrees
to investigate, the Panel conducts the investigation
and then submits its findings to the Board and Bank
Management. Management then submits its own recommendations to the Board, and the Board makes
the final decision on what actions to take.
Since its creation in 1993, the Panel has received
approximately 56 complaints, 18 of which came from
Africa.44 While the Panel has addressed various projects that had a negative impact on the right to health
(for example, due to environmental contamination

or displacement of people), it has not yet received
a request to investigate the leakage of funds from
the health sector (or any other sector). Such leakage
can and should be brought to the Panel’s attention
because it stems, at least in part, from the Bank’s failure to implement several of its own policies and procedures. The Bank’s Articles of Agreement provide
that “[t]he Bank shall make arrangements to ensure
that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes
for which the loan was granted.”45 This provision is reiterated in the Bank’s Operational Policy on Project
Supervision (OP 13.05), as well as the Operational
Policy on Financial Management (OP 10.02). OP
13.05 not only stresses the importance of monitoring and evaluation to identify problems, but also
notes the need to prepare implementation completion reports in order to “account for use of Bank
resources.”46 Moreover, OP 10.02 requires the Bank
to “take… action to rectify the situation” if the borrower
fails to maintain acceptable financial management
arrangements or to submit the necessary financial
reports by their due dates.
Finally, in many cases involving leakage, the Bank
may have violated its Disclosure Policy. Unless budget allocations and the results of surveys, such as
PETS, are made available to civil society, people cannot effectively demand the resources to which they
are entitled. As noted above, in Kenya, PETS found
that provinces and districts were unaware of budgets
and programs.47 In Chad, PETS demonstrated that
“the total lack of transparency of budgetary information at the regional and district levels greatly facilitates the capture of the MOH budget at the central
level.”48 This lack of transparency is exacerbated by
the Bank’s narrow Disclosure Policy which provides
only a limited list of the information that may be
disclosed. Recognizing this issue, the Bank recently
launched a comprehensive review of its policy and is
moving toward disclosing any information that is not
on a list of exceptions.49 Under the new policy, which
will become effective in July 2010, the public should
have access to numerous documents that are relevant
to identifying and quantifying leakage, which include
audited financial reports. Failure to provide or disseminate these documents could support a request
for investigation by the Panel.

Linking internal policy violation to human rights
obligations
The internal policy violations discussed above are
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closely related to both procedural and substantive
human rights norms. Thus, in drafting a request
to the Inspection Panel, individuals or groups may
strengthen their claims by grounding them in the
language of human rights, as well as in the texts of
internal policies. Recent changes in the Bank’s general
attitude toward human rights, as well as some recent
decisions by the Inspection Panel, suggest that using
a human rights framework to interpret the Bank’s
internal policies may be an effective way to hold the
Bank accountable for acts and omissions that implicate human rights.
The Bank policies discussed above are particularly
linked to procedural obligations, as monitoring,
evaluation, supervision, sound management, and
investigation are the basic means of preventing
violations of human rights, including the right to
health and the closely related right to life. While
human rights treaties do not specify how rights
should be protected and therefore do not explicitly mention the obligation to monitor, evaluate, or
investigate, according to Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “[i]t
is now widely accepted that references to ‘ensuring’
the full enjoyment of the enumerated rights in comprehensive human rights treaties impose affirmative
obligations.”50 In fact, “bodies charged with monitoring compliance with these human rights treaties
have insisted that a series of steps are required to
ensure the full enjoyment of the rights at issue, at
least those — the right to life and to be free of torture — where violations are of the most basic rights
and thus are of special concern.”51
The Human Rights Commission (HRC), for example, has directly rejected the argument that State parties have no duty to investigate human rights violations, since there is no explicit provision for such as
duty.52 Indeed, the HRC has found that State parties
have “a duty to investigate thoroughly alleged violations
of human rights, and in particular . . . violations
of the right to life, and to prosecute criminally, try
and punish those held responsible for such violations.”53 Although the duty to investigate and provide
a remedy generally arises in cases involving forced
disappearance, torture, or death, the large-scale leakage of funds from Africa’s health sector implicates
the right to life by preventing countless individuals
from obtaining life-saving medical care. Indeed, the
European Commission has interpreted the right to
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life as not only preventing the unlawful taking of life,
but also creating a positive obligation to take appropriate steps to safeguard lives.54 Moreover, some
courts have specifically found that the right to life
creates positive obligations to provide adequate and
competent medical care.55 Consequently, even if the
duty to investigate were limited to cases involving
violations of the most fundamental rights, the massive leakage of funds from the health sector arguably
falls within that class of cases.56
In addition, the Bank’s disclosure policy is closely
linked to the right to the information, which is both
substantive and procedural in nature.57 Utilizing
human rights language may be especially helpful
in situations where the Bank’s current disclosure
policy or its revised policy falls short of providing
the desired information. Groups such as the Global
Transparency Initiative point out several shortcomings with the Bank’s proposed revisions to its disclosure policy, including overly-broad exceptions, third
party veto power over release of information, lack
of detail about how requests for information will
be processed, and the absence of an independent
appeals body.58 Even the IEG recently recommended
“making better information public . . . in ways that
stimulate public demand for more efficient and less
corrupt service delivery.”59 Combining language
about the right to information with language about
the Bank’s disclosure policy may therefore be the
most persuasive and powerful means of triggering an
investigation by the Panel.
The right to participation is another right, with both
substantive and procedural aspects, that is closely
related to the right to information. The World Bank’s
own diagnostic studies on governance and corruption show that “external voice” (that is, the ability of
non-governmental actors to demand information and
accountability) is likely the key determinant in adherence to pro-poor priorities and financial probity.60
In 2008, the IEG confirmed that “corruption can
be substantially reduced only when the supply-side
reforms are complemented by systematic efforts to
increase the citizens’ capability to monitor and challenge abuses of the system and to inform the citizens
about their rights and entitlements.”61 Yet “[i]ncreasing awareness of the potential role of civil society in
fighting corruption has only materialized in a few of
the Bank’s anticorruption lending programs.”62 The
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Bank’s failure to protect civil society’s right to participation in its anticorruption programs clearly contributes to the problem of leakage and should therefore
be raised as an issue in requests for inspection.63
Although raising human rights obligations in this
manner may, at first glance, appear irrelevant or futile,
recent changes within the Bank and some decisions
by the Inspection Panel provide support for this
approach. After years of hiding behind its mandate
not to interfere in political affairs and resisting a
human rights-based approach to development, the
Bank has finally accepted that its activities implicate
human rights.64 In 2005, Senior Vice President and
General Counsel Roberto Danino issued a legal opinion, which stated that “the Articles of Agreement
permit, and in some cases require, the Bank to recognize the human rights dimensions of its development policies and activities since it is now evident
that human rights are an intrinsic part of the Bank’s
mission.”65 The following year, the new Senior Vice
President and General Counsel Ana Palacio confirmed that “the Bank can and sometimes should
take human rights into consideration as part of its
decision making process.”66 She explained that “[t]
he challenge we now face is to clarify how these legal
concepts should be specifically incorporated into the
work of the Bank in order to further its mission of
sustainable and equitable development.”67

work. In investigating the Bank’s Chad-Cameroon
Pipeline Project (2002), Edward S. Ayensu, the former Chairperson of the Inspection Panel, found
“human rights implicitly embedded in various policies of the Bank.”69 Mr. Ayensu called upon the Bank
to be “more forthcoming about articulating its role
in promoting rights within the countries in which it
operates” and encouraged the Bank to study “the
wider ramifications of human rights violations as
these relate to the overall success or failure of policy
compliance in Bank-financed projects.”70 In its report
on this project, the Panel stated that human rights
considerations are relevant when they “impede the
implementation of the Project in a manner compatible with the Bank’s policies.”71 Since leakage clearly
undermines the purpose of health sector loans and is
incompatible with the Bank’s policies, it represents a
situation where human rights implications should be
taken into account.

Palacio recognized not only that the World Bank’s
activities have a human rights dimension, but also that
the legal principles enshrined in human rights norms
provide a “baseline” for assessing development policies and programs. She further acknowledged that, in
certain cases, human rights norms generate actionable legal obligations that arise from both international treaties and national laws. In particular, Palacio
stressed that human rights principles are relevant to
“[a]reas of governance or the legal empowerment of
the poor.” The rights violations related to leakage,
including lack of monitoring and investigation, failure to disclose information, and inadequate participation are clearly relevant to both of these areas.

More recently, in investigating the Honduras Land
Administration Project (2007), the Panel found that
the Bank Policy on Project Appraisal, Operational
Manual Statement (OMS) 2.20, required Bankfinanced projects to respect international agreements
on human rights and indigenous peoples when the
project country is a signatory.72 This was “the first
time that the Panel explicitly addressed the merits of
a claim based on international human rights law.” In
the request for inspection, the indigenous Garifuna
community claimed that the project violated the
Government of Honduras’s obligations under the
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention
No. 169. While the Panel stressed that its mandate
was limited to questions of internal compliance, it still
found the ILO Convention provisions applicable to
the Bank through the OMS 2.20, which requires the
Bank to ensure that financial activities are consistent
with a borrower’s international agreements regarding
the environment, as well as the health and well-being
of its citizens. The Panel expressed “serious concern”
with the General Counsel’s argument that OMS 2.20
should only apply to international obligations that are
“essentially of an environmental nature.”

The Bank’s Inspection Panel has also opened the door
for claimants to “incorporate a wide range of human
rights-related concerns into their complaints.”68 A
few of its decisions during the past decade explicitly
address the relevance of human rights to the Bank’s

These decisions by the Panel, which confirm that the
Bank must engage with human rights concerns in certain situations, should be cited and utilized to support
requests to investigate leakage in health sector loans.
Such decisions, coupled with the Bank’s nascent rec-
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ognition of the relevance of human rights norms to
its work, provide relevant context for interpreting the
Bank’s policies and add a deeper dimension to the
analysis of these claims.

Challenges in seeking accountability for leakage of
health sector funds through the inspection panel
While the Inspection Panel has helped ground the
dialogue about the relevance of human rights norms
to the World Bank’s work by applying these concepts
in concrete situations, it also has its own limitations
that hamper its use as a true accountability mechanism. First, the role of the Requesters is quite limited, as they do not have an opportunity to rebut
Management’s response or propose alternative recommendations for action. Although the Panel clarified in 1999 that Management must consult with the
requester and other affected people in preparing an
action plan, the Panel acknowledges that such consultation often does not occur.73 To make matters worse,
even where Management engages in consultation
with the Requesters, only Management has access to
the Panel’s report during this process, which, as the
Panel recognizes, creates an “unfortunate structural
asymmetry.”74 The Panel is currently seeking ways
of increasing participation by the Requesters and
affected people in the overall process.75
Second, the standard for establishing a violation is
quite high. The Panel will address “only those material
adverse effects, alleged in the request, that have totally or
partially resulted from serious Bank failure of compliance
with its policies and procedures,” thereby requiring
a causal link between the Bank’s noncompliance
and the material harm.76 This link may be difficult
to establish where the issue is leakage from an entire
health sector. While the Bank clearly violates its own
internal policies by failing to perform its monitoring,
evaluation, and supervision responsibilities, it may be
difficult to show that those violations directly resulted in
material harm to specific individuals.
Third, the Panel will not accept a request for inspection if at least 95% of the loan financing has already
been disbursed.77 Given that PETS take a long time
to complete and require the collection of a significant amount of data before reaching any meaningful
quantitative results, the results of these surveys may
not be available until long after disbursement is complete. Under the Bank’s new disclosure policy, however, other forms of information should be made
102 • health and human rights

available that may assist in identifying leakage at an
earlier stage.
Moreover, even if the Panel finds that the Bank has
violated its own policies, it does not have the power
to make the final decision about what actions the
Bank should take, if any, to remedy the situation.
The Bank’s Board of Directors, not the Panel, adopts
the final action plans, which often do not respond
adequately to the Panel’s findings.78 In addition, the
Panel lacks powers of enforcement, restitution, and
oversight over the implementation of remedial measures.79 The Panel is, however, taking steps to address
this concern. For example, the Panel has made it a
practice to return to affected areas in order to give
briefings on the results of the investigation, and on a
few occasions, has played a more substantive role in
post-investigation activities.80
Thus, while the Panel certainly has its limitations as
an accountability mechanism, it has been finding new
ways to address some of these shortcomings. The
Panel is a dynamic entity that is being shaped and
molded by the claims it is asked to address. As more
and more challenging cases are being brought before
the Panel, including cases that raise serious human
rights concerns, the Panel will be forced to explore
the outer edges of its mandate and perhaps even
push those boundaries further.
conclusion
The international community can no longer afford to
ignore the massive leakage of donor funds from critical social sectors, such as health, particularly when
this leakage occurs in the poorest places on the planet.
Instead of blaming only the recipient governments
for such leakage, solutions should focus on holding
both donors and borrowers accountable for the use
of funds. Although the actions of IFIs, such as the
World Bank, helped create the impoverished situations that plague sub-Saharan Africa today through
devastating structural adjustment programs, these
IFIs have largely escaped any true call to accountability.
Holding donors accountable is a legally challenging task, but it is not impossible. The World Bank’s
Inspection Panel is one potential venue for holding
the Bank accountable for leakage of funds from the
health sector. The problem of leakage should be
framed both in terms of the Bank’s violations of its
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own policies and in terms of closely related violations
of basic human rights obligations. Organizations concerned with the leakage of health sector funds should
therefore consider filing a request for inspection with
the Panel, especially in the absence of other available
channels to bring complaints against the Bank.
Concerns with aid effectiveness and accountability
are especially critical at present due to an aid climate
that is shifting from project-specific loans to general
budget support. Many poverty reduction strategies,
which cut across multiple sectors, including health,
are now funded through general budget support,
whereby the government simply disburses the money
through its own financial management system. While
general budget support helps simplify and unify
procurement, disbursement, and management procedures, it may also amplify the risk of leakage by
making it harder for donors to trace how the funds
are being used.81 Pledges of greater funding for the
health sector may have little meaning if the Bank
does not take the necessary steps to ensure that the
funds actually reach the intended beneficiaries.
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